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INTRODUCTION
Just about three years ago, in light of the financial collapse of Enron, Douglas
Baird and Robert Rasmussen dramatically announced that the U.S. privately
negotiated reorganization regime, known worldwide simply as Chapter 11,1 is
effectively dead.2 Two of the most notable bankruptcy law scholars of the last two
decades, Baird and Rasmussen have continuously criticized the fundamental
principles of Chapter 11 and have been calling for its replacement by market-based
bankruptcy regimes.3 In The End of Bankruptcy they argued that the actual practice
proves that most Chapter 11 cases are streamlined towards a public sale of the
corporate debtor, either as a sale of its assets or as a sale of the equity interests
therein. Thus, in their eyes, the contours of Chapter 11, envisioning an internally
negotiated reorganization plan between the debtor and its creditors, no longer rule and
rightfully so.4

Others disagree with the generalization reflected in Baird and

Rasmussen's contention. For example, Lynn LoPucki has countered by contesting
Baird and Rasmussen's argument in light of a systematic compilation of corporate
bankruptcy data that he has accumulated over the years.5 The broad strokes with
which Baird and Rasmussen chose to depict contemporary U.S. bankruptcy law
notwithstanding, the practice appears to indeed mitigate the theoretical dichotomy
between a prototypical private-bargaining bankruptcy regime and a market-based
1
2

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101- 1174.
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751

(2002).
3

See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the
Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 Va. L. Rev. 921 (2001); Robert K.
Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice , 1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1; Robert
K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 51
(1992); D.G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 L. & Contemp. Problems 173 (1987); Douglas G.
Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganization, 15 J. Legal Studies 127 (1986) (hereinafter:
Baird, Uneasy Case).
4
Baird & Rasmussen, supra n.2.
5
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen's
The End of Bankruptcy, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 645 (2003).
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bankruptcy regime. Yet, the strong academic debate concerning the superiority of any
of these prototypes seems to live on.6
The academic debate surrounding the normative bankruptcy law seems at times to
touch the most sensitive nerves of political and social science, confronting orthodox
libertarians and modern liberals and socialists.7

Close examiners of the themes

underlying the grand academic debate over bankruptcy law will quickly identify the
specific flavor of U.S. bankruptcy law. The debate has always been all about Chapter
11. Either a scholar liked it or opposed it all together. In recent years, Chapter 11 has
become a measuring stick against which various Western World countries examine
their own bankruptcy laws. Many countries have considered enacting a corporate
reorganization regime which would follow, at least partially, the model of Chapter 11.
Accordingly, the grand academic debate has been exported to other continents as well.
With respect to this fascinating and heated academic debate, this article follows the
realistic acknowledgement of prominent scholars such as Mark Roe and Oliver Hart,
who understand that innovative theoretical models for bankruptcy reform, which have
been proposed over the years, may be inapplicable for certain countries because they
are either politically unacceptable8 or incompatible with those countries' economic
structures.9 Thus, once one overcomes the urge to single-handedly save the world by
introducing an ultimately triumphant bankruptcy model, the debate merits
concretization and focus on actual countries or economic environments.
6

With respect to U.S. law specifically, however, Omer Tene contends that the "grand"
academic debate concerning the desirability of Chapter 11 altogether and whether its existence is at all
justifiable has given way to a more "moderate" debate, which takes the existence of Chapter 11 as a
given and thus addresses internal Chapter 11 issues in an attempt to improve its overall functioning.
Omer Tene, Revisiting the Creditors' Bargain: The Entitlement to the Going-Concern Surplus in
Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 19 Bank. Dev. J. 287 (2003).
7
See S. Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 Ill. L. Rev. 503, 510518 (describing the "great divide" in bankruptcy theory).
8
See Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 217, 236 (1998).
9
See Oliver Hart, Different Approaches to Bankruptcy, NBER Working Paper 7921, (2000)
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7921.pdf ("It is unlikely that 'one size fits all' … Which
procedure a country chooses or should choose may … depend on other factors, e.g., the country's
institutional structure and legal tradition … It is important to recognize that bankruptcy reform should
not be seen in isolation: it may be necessary to combine it with legal and other reforms, e.g., the
training of judges, improvements in corporate governance and the strengthening of investor rights, and
possibly even changes in the international financial system."). Indeed, the very diversity of existing
corporate and bankruptcy laws around the world may be explained as an evolutional result of different
preexisting legal, economic and political conditions. See Mark J. Roe, STRONG MANAGERS – WEAK
OWNERS (1994) (developing the path dependency narrative of the evolution of contemporary corporate
governance of publicly traded U.S. corporations); David A. Skeel, Jr., DEBT'S DOMINION – A HISTORY
OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001) (analyzing the gradual development of U.S. bankruptcy law
based on the driving forces in the American economy and politics at the time); Bruce H. Mann,
REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2002).
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This article focuses on a wide spectrum of countries, the common denominator of
which is that their economy is considerably characterized by the dominant role the
local banks play in financing most of the corporate activity.

The article will

demonstrate the realistic relationship between banking dominance and the functioning
of various bankruptcy law models. In concentrated banking economies, banks are
strongly involved in two phases of a typical corporate bankruptcy case. First, they
stand to collect from the firm as the senior secured creditors of the corporate debtor.
Secondly, often those banks are the financing sources for the operation of the
distressed firm while it undergoes bankruptcy and for the emergence of that firm out
of bankruptcy. In concentrated banking, the number of banks available for corporate
financing is rather limited. This makes the bank's position in bankruptcy crucial for
the entire outcome of the case.

Unfortunately, the oligopolistic structure of the

banking industry in such economies exposes the corporate debtors and their non-bank
creditors to extensive risks. As shall be elaborated later,10 the banks might use their
stronghold over the corporate fate to extract excessive interest rates and limit their
bankruptcy-ending financing in a conservative manner.

In addition, during

negotiations over financing the exit from bankruptcy an ad hoc debtor-bank or
acquirer-bank coalition might be formed which would result in the squeezing out of
the junior creditors. Thus, corporate bankruptcy regimes which are effectively bank
dependent might fail to fulfill satisfactorily bankruptcy law policy. That is, under
such regimes it is doubtful whether the firm's resources would be allocated to their
highest-valuing user and whether bankruptcy would maximize the return to the
corporate creditors as a whole.11
To fully appreciate the close interaction between corporate bankruptcy and the
structure of a country's banking industry one must first clearly categorize the various
bankruptcy law models often compared in the academic literature. There

exist

various bankruptcy laws around the world which include a chapter on corporate
reorganization or rescue. The first step often taken in pursuit of this goal is a statutory
or judicially imposed moratorium, temporarily staying all collection actions against
10

See Part III infra.
On the goals of bankruptcy law compare Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an
Imperfect World, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 336 (1993) (emphasizing both allocative efficiency and distributive
goals); with Barry Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 343 (1997); Douglas
G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 Yale L.J. 573 (1998); Hart, supra note 9 (all
emphasizing efficiency as the compass for normative bankruptcy law).
11
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the corporate debtor.12 But beyond this immediate relief, the ultimate goal of the case
is to effectuate a reorganization plan that would assist the firm to exit bankruptcy
while maintaining its core business.13 This plan can be designed and constructed in a
variety of ways. Two basic prototypes stand out in the literature on corporate
reorganization. The first is a reorganization plan which is negotiated privately by the
person in control of the reorganizing firm and its creditors. This prototype thus
entails an endogenous reorganization, in that it involves only the debtor's
prebankruptcy actors: managers, creditors and the old equityholders. The second
reorganization prototype turns exogenously to the forces of the market. Under this
prototype, bankruptcy either utilizes a public auction of the debtor firm and awards
the control thereof to the highest bidder14 or applies one of a variety of similar
sophisticated mechanisms which would determine in an economic fashion the residual
economic stakeholder in the firm.15 This prototype opens the bankruptcy case to new
actors and allows any person, whether previously related to the debtor (holding claims
against it or equity interests therein) or not, to participate in the crafting of a financial
solution for the ailing debtor by bidding for its future control and operation.16
Chapter 11 has been under academic fire, especially from the law and economics
wing, primarily because of two reasons. First, because it leaves management with a
superior bargaining position vis-a-vis the corporate creditors.17 Secondly, in its early
days, Chapter 11 channeled the resolution of the corporate distress to exclusive
bargaining between the prebankruptcy parties, rather than opening the corporate gates
for a market evaluation of the firm.18 As noted above, the academic criticizers of

12

For a statutory imposed automatic stay see the U.S. Bankruptcy Code § 362(a). For a
judicially imposed moratorium see, e.g., The Insolvency Act, 1986 § 11(3) (U.K.); Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act s. 69 (Canada); The Faillissementswet § 213 (The Netherlands).
13
Unless it is concluded that the corporation has no viable business worth rescuing, in which
case the trustee will move for converting the case to liquidation.
14
See Part I.B.1 infra.
15
See Part I.B.2 infra.
16
Barry Adler lists two prototypes of bankruptcy law somewhat differently. The first, an ex post
approach to corporate insolvency, empowers a court to supervise the insolvent firm and determine its
subsequent fate, whether it be reorganized or liquidated. The alternative prototype is an ex ante
approach to corporate insolvency, under which upon the financial state of insolvency a firm strictly
adheres to its investors' predetermined contractual undertaking as of the time of investment. Adler,
supra n.11.
17
Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 Yale L.J.
1043 (1992).
18
This interpretation of Chapter 11 has been modified by the Supreme Court in 1999. The Court
held that whenever a reorganization plan is proposed by the debtor and purports to leave value to the
equityholders while certain creditors shall not get paid in full, the field automatically opens for the
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Chapter 11 have been calling for its substitution by market-based mechanisms. Yet
the market-based models developed in the literature share a basic characteristic: they
all entail the use of cash at the exit point upon which the firm is to emerge from
bankruptcy. The underlying assumption of these models was that raising the requisite
cash is not a problematic issue. However, subsequent papers started to question this
simplistic assumption and raised the concern whether these models could work when
cash is not readily available as presumed. This paper joins those who are concerned
that cash constraints may prove certain models inadequate. In particular, it adds to
this skepticism the dimension of concentrated banking. This paper will illuminate
how the banking oligopoly may distort the efficient functioning of cash-driven models
of corporate bankruptcy. It will show that such regimes would simply not work in
concentrated banking economies.
In light of the shortcomings of the cash-driven models of bankruptcy, the
approach I suggest herein is to adopt non-cash bankruptcy auctions as the model for
concentrated banking economies. Non-cash auctions enjoy the benefit of relying on
market-based valuations of the firm. Yet, in departing from cash payments, this
proposed bankruptcy model may reduce the dependency of the various actors, most
notably potential bidders, on the dominating banks' financing. This in turn would
level the ground for the auction by allowing bidders to value the debtor firm based on
their own valuations rather than on the banks'. Encouraging independent valuations in
such a fashion would, in my eyes, facilitate meeting the goal of handing the firm to its
highest-valuing user. It would also maximize the overall return to the prebankruptcy
creditors as a whole.
This paper is developed as follows: Part I outlines the principal contours of the
two prototypical corporate bankruptcies. First, it describes the workings of privatelynegotiated bankruptcies, such as Chapter 11. The analysis will emphasize the main
flaw which the literature has found in this prototype, namely that it is an invitation to
distort the valuation of the firm due to inequality of bargaining positions inside the
bankruptcy arena.

Subsequently, the market-based models of bankruptcy are

analyzed. This analysis will distinguish more particularly between proposals calling
for the outright auction of the distressed firm19 and models which have called for the

presentation of competing proposals before confirmation of the plan. Bank of America National Trust
and Savings Assoc. v. 203 North La Salle St. Partnership, 526 U.S. 434 (1999).
19
See the Baird Proposal in Part I.B.1 infra.
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conversion of the prebankruptcy claims into new reorganization rights prior to making
the final resolution on the firm's fate.20
Part II will temporarily abandon the bankruptcy discourse in order to set the stage
and introduce the specific nature of concentrated banking economies.

The

phenomenon of concentrated banking has been the subject of various economic
studies in recent years. A main theme in this research is trying to address the question
whether such a structure of a country's financial market is overall good or bad. Not
surprisingly, the opinions have been split over this matter. But what the literature can
tell us is, that even assuming that the overall effect of concentrated banking is
constructive, it bears nonetheless potential risks for borrowing firms.

The most

apparent risk is the limited supply of financing sources and difficulties it creates for
developing businesses by entrepreneurs.
This paper will avoid taking sides in the concentrated banking debate. Rather, it
wishes to relate the risks associated with concentrated banking to the functioning of
various bankruptcy models. This task is undertaken in Part III of the paper. This part
integrates the various models of bankruptcy discussed previously into the melting pot
of a concentrated banking economy and tests the outcome. It shows that cash-driven
models of bankruptcy are likely to fail as the bank's position as the ultimate and sole
suppliers of financing for the bankruptcy resolution would adversely affect this
resolution. The banks enjoy a close-knitted oligopoly in which the financing terms of
one are easily revealed by the others. The paper will show that the joint interest of the
banks is to reduce the financing for acquiring control of a distressed firm and to set
that financing at a level which is a function of the senior lender's prebankruptcy claim.
This limitation will at times deny identifying the highest valuing-user. Thus, cashdriven bankruptcy models are simply tailored for economies in which actors in the
market enjoy a diversity of financing sources, but are incompatible with the
conditions of concentrated banking.
As a result of the failure of cash-driven bankruptcy models, Part IV proposes to
adopt a soft version of exogenous bankruptcy. That is, the proposal endorses the
concept of subjecting the elusive value of the distressed firm to market forces. Thus,
an open and unlimited auction for the control of the firm should take place. However,
given the severe financing obstacle bidders face in concentrated banking economies,

20

See the Bebchuk Proposal and the AHM Proposal in Part I.B.2 infra
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this paper calls for allowing non-cash auctions to take place.

In such auctions,

bidders would value the firm without necessarily having to raise cash upfront. The
winning bidder would pay off the firm's debts to its creditors through installment
payments or through the conversion of part of those claims into equity rights in the
firm. Such a system would encourage bidding for the control of the firm. The
enhanced competition is likely to generate more reliable valuations of the firm.
Nonetheless, the proposal also clarifies that because this system does not employ
actual realization of the firm's assets, the bids and the valuations reflected therein
must be forwarded to the approving vote of the firm's creditors.

I. Corporate Reorganizations: A Tale of Two Prototypes
Bankruptcy practice exhibits two distinct types of corporate resurrection. One
employs endogenous efforts of the debtor and its creditors to overcome the existing
financial crisis by rearranging the creditors' prebankruptcy claims and converting
parts thereof into newly issued debt or equity instruments. This type shall be referred
to as private bargaining reorganization. The other relies on exogenous forces to step in
and acquire the control of the corporate enterprise while paying off the prebankruptcy
claims. This type shall be referred to as market based corporate reorganization. This
part examines the contours of each of these reorganization schemes and outlines their
distinctive characteristics.

In order to emphasize the fundamentals of each

reorganization prototype and its relative strengths or weaknesses the analysis will
assume, at this point, that all markets are alike and disregard the specific
characteristics of different types of economies around the world. Thus, any country is
assumed to be ripe for adopting either the endogenous or the exogenous
reorganization regime. Later, in Parts III and IV of this paper, the assumption of
homogeneity of countries shall be relaxed in favor of the real world's diversity of
economic systems. The compatibility of each of the two prototypes to certain types of
economies shall then be examined more specifically.

A. Private Bargaining
1. Crafting a Reorganization Plan
In a private bargaining reorganization, the debtor and its creditors engage in
extensive negotiations towards the development of a comprehensive reorganization
plan. Reorganization plans contain two major parts. The first is a business plan for
8

the future operation of the reorganized firm.

The second part deals with the

retirement of the corporate outstanding debt. The plan must specify the method of
payment, whether by means of a cash payment, installment payments, or conversion
of debt to equity interests, including all modifications to the original rights of the
creditors (i.e. the prepetition claims) as a result of the payment means utilized
thereunder. The trademark of a private bargaining reorganization is that, unlike in a
liquidation case, there is no actual sale of the corporate assets (whether as a whole or
piecemeal).21 The corpus of the corporate business remains intact. While the capital
structure of the company is restructured, no realization of the assets ever takes place.22
The restructuring of the corporate capital necessitates a valuation of the corporation.
The valuation is imperative in connection with the second element of a reorganization
plan. That is, a valuation of the corporation is required for determining the payoffs of
the prebankruptcy claims. In bankruptcy, the satisfaction of the creditors' approved
claims is based on the absolute priority rule.23 Under this rule, any distribution of
value to a group of creditors may be done only if there is enough value remaining in
the corporate assets after full satisfaction of the senior ranking claims.24 The greater
the value assigned to the corporation, the farther the distribution to creditors goes.

2. The Valuation Distortion
Absent actual realization of the corporate assets through a liquidation sale, the
valuation of the debtor corporation remains an inexact science at best. There are no
verifiable monetary figures extracted from an actual sale of the assets.25 Rather,
valuation is a matter of intelligent probabilistic estimation of the debtor's future
performance.26 It is based on the analysis of economic experts. Such analyses are
21

See Thomas H. Jackson, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 201-212 (1986);
Douglas G.Baird, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 198-206 (3rd ed. 2001).
22
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganization, 101 Harv. L. Rev 775,
778 (1988) (hereinafter: Bebchuk, New Approach); Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of
American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 311, 314 (1993); Baird, Uneasy Case, supra n.3, at
127-128.
23
The phrase "absolute priority rule" was first coined in James C. Bonbright & Milton M.
Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganization,
28 Colum .L. Rev. 127 (1928).
24
For a statutory expression of the absolute priority rule, see Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b).
25
David G. Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely Character of Bankruptcy Valuations, 41
Am. U.L. Rev 63, 70-74 (1991).
26
Cf. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Marshall, 125 F.2d 943, 946 (2nd Cir. 1942) ("The
fallacy in that argument stems largely from lack of recognition of the eely character of the word 'value'.
It is a bewitching word which, for years, has disturbed mental peace and caused numerous useless
debates. Perhaps it would be better for the peace of men's minds if the word were abolished. Reams of
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ordered by interested parties. Unfortunately, the experience of recent years proves
more than ever before that the use of experts' analyses to substantiate a valuation of a
corporation is an invitation to introduce self-interested valuations that serve the
strategic cause of the party ordering the valuation.27 Indeed, to the extent the valuing
person lacks complete independence in its valuation of the corporation, its economic
ties with the ordering party, its compensation for the valuation, or its own stake in the
entity being valued, is liable to compromise its valuation.28

In the context of

valuation for the purpose of reorganization, the various creditors and the
equityholders face conflicting interests in this respect, and thus invite subjective, selfserving, strategic valuations of the debtor.29

The senior creditors seek a

conservatively low valuation of the debtor corporation, because this would make them
the exclusive economic owners of the reorganized corporation.30 On the other hand,

good paper and gallons of good ink have been wasted by those who have tried to give it a constant and
precise meaning… And there, as almost always, 'value' involves a conjecture, a guess, a prediction, a
prophecy… 'Like all values, as the word is used by the law, it depends largely on more or less certain
prophecies of the future; and the value is no less real … if later the prophecy turns out false than when
it comes out true.' Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 155, 49 S.Ct. 291, 292, 73 L.Ed.
647.")
27
Stephen J. Leocock, The Anatomy of Valuing Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Pursuing
the Phantom of Objectivity in the New Millennium, 2001 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 161, 165 (2001); Park
McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need to Shareholder Self Help in an Age of
Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 Emory L.J 163, 205-212 (1997); David G. Carlson, Secured Creditors
and the Eely Character of Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 Am. U.L. Rev 63, 70-74 .(1991); Bruce A.
Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 69,
120 (1991).
28
This is perhaps the greatest lesson the entire accounting practice has learned first-hand from
the Enron debacle. See "Who Fiddled What? 'Errors of Judgment' are Piling Up at Andersen", The
Economist, Dec. 22, 2001; David Barboza, Enron Inquiry Now Focusing on Valuations, The New
York Times, May 13, 2002; Joseph Fuller and Michael Jensen, End the Myth-Making and Return to
True Analysis: Viewpoint Joseph Fuller and Michael Jensen: Analysts' Forecasts Have Become Too
Powerful and it is Time for Companies to Stop Colluding with their Inflated Expectations, Financial
Times (London, England), Jan. 22, 2002; Harvey Rice, The Fall of Enron;
Sources Say Assets of Driller Inflated, The Houston Chronicle, Sept. 22, 2002; Connor Dignam,
Choosing the Winners in the Brand Value Game: Cash Valuations Alone do not Fully Reflect the
Strengths and Weaknesses of the World's Top Brands, Financial Times, Aug. 6, 2002; Andrew Hill and
Sheila McNulty, Energy Groups under Renewed Pressure Mark-To-Market Accounting, Financial
Times, Jan. 31, 2002; Peter Martin, Always Expect the Unexpected: Enron's Collapse Should Remind
Us that No Accounting or Valuation Technique Can Disguise the Inherent Riskiness of Business,
Financial Times, Jan. 29, 2002.
29
On the creditors' subjective valuation see John M. Czarnetzky, Time, Uncertainty and the Law
of Corporate Reorganizations, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2939, 2985 (1999).
30
This strategic calculation by a senior creditor is applicable when the creditor assumes that its
claim might be valued lower than the firm's aggregate value and that the plan allocates equity interests
in exchange for the prebankruptcy claims. See Adler, supra n.22, at 318. In the case of a secured
creditor who is concerned that its collateral is likely to be valued lower than its claim (that is, an
undersecured claim) and that the payoff will be in debt instruments, the creditor's interest is to attempt
inflating the value of the collateral, in order to increase its secured claim and decrease its unsecured
deficiency claim. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, A New Approach to Valuing Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2386, 2398-2401 (2001).
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junior claimants and even more so the old equityholders are in search of a high
valuation of the corporation, in hope of retaining a stake in the reorganized corporate
capital.31 Thus, privately negotiated reorganization plans entail the risks of over- or
undervaluation, depending on the particular valuation introduced.32 Either way, the
distribution of value amongst the various classes of claims is liable to be distorted and
fail to reflect the true economic stakes in the corporation.

Privately negotiated

reorganization plans increase the probability of transfer of value from one class to
another based on the relative bargaining leverage each negotiating party holds. In
addition, self-interested valuations violate the economic goal of placing the corporate
assets in the hands of their most efficient user.33 In short, the valuation distortion
undermines the reliability, the efficiency and the fairness of the privately negotiated
reorganization scheme as a means for resolving the financial crisis of a corporation.
Nonetheless, the valuation distortion in private bargaining reorganizations may be
ameliorated by entrusting the entire valuation process in the exclusive hands of an
independent person, free from any biases of the old management, shareholders or
classes of creditors. Indeed, in various insolvency regimes around the world an
appointed trustee is the person that is required to evaluate the corporation and propose
a payment plan based on the corporation's assigned value.34 The trustee is considered
an objective party as it is free of preexisting economic stakes in the corporation.35

31

Michael C. Jensen, Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance, 4 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 13,
31 (1991); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 527, 547-548 (1983); Bebchuk, New Approach, supra note 22, at 779; Robert F. Reilly,
Valuation - Big Businesses vs. Small, 1995 ABI JNL Lexis 126 (1995); Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas
M. Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 1061, 1063-1066 (1985); J. Bradley Johnston,
The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 Am. Bankr. L.J 213, 264-265 (1991).
32
Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 31, at 1105-1107; Bebchuk, New Approach, supra note 22, at
780; Bradley, The Bankruptcy Bargain, supra note 31, at 241.
33
Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & Econ. 633, 634 (1993)
(hereinafter: Baird, Auctions Revised); Baird, Uneasy Case, supra n.3, at 133.
34
See, e.g., in the U.K., G. Lightman & G. Moss, THE LAW OF RECEIVERS AND
ADMINISTRATORS OF COMPANIES, 457-459 (2000); 2-21 COLLIER INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
INSOLVENCY GUIDE 21.05 [d][i][vi] (Richard F. Broude ed., 1999); Robert R. Pennington,
PENNINGTON'S CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, 327 (1991); M. Phillips & J. Goldring, Rescue and
Reconstruction, 15 Insolv. Int. 75, 75-78 (2002). Cf. F. Tolmie, INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE AND
PERSONAL INSOLVENCY LAW, 107-112 (1998).
35
The identity of the person or group controlling the corporation while its undergoing
reorganization has been recently acknowledged as a central issue in analyzing the efficacy of any
particular reorganization regime. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 3. See also John Armour, Brian
R. Cheffins & David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy
Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1699 (2002); David A. Skeel, Creditors'
Ball: The "New" New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 917 (2003); D. Hahn,
Concentrated Ownership and Control of Corporate Reorganizations, 4 J. Corp. L. Stud. 117 (2004).
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This position a trustee enjoys ostensibly portrays a valuation it ordered as a bias-free
valuation of the financially distressed corporation.36

B. Market Based Bankruptcies
1. Public Auctions
a. Auctions of Distressed Firms in Practice
The alternative reorganization prototype is one that in lieu of privately bargaining
a plan between the preexisting management, equityholders and creditors, puts the firm
up for sale on the market and seeks the highest bid thereon. The proceeds of the sale
paid by the winning bidder are used to pay off the prebankruptcy claims based on the
absolute priority rule. Indeed, such an approach to corporate bankruptcy can be found
in practice in Sweden.37 A Swedish insolvent firm may propose a compromise plan,
but only with its unsecured creditors. Because this scheme is partial in its nature and
excludes the treatment of secured creditors and priority claims, these creditors can
refuse full payment to the unsecured creditors and thus frustrate the effectuating of a
workable plan. Thus, it is seldom used.38 Rather, the common alternatives available
for insolvent firms are to arrange a sale of the firm’s assets and repay the creditors out
of the proceeds received therefrom. Two paths of sales are available. The first path is
a “pre-pack sale”, which is arranged out-of-court by the management and approved by
the secured creditors. Upon the execution of the sale, the firm files for bankruptcy
primarily to allow junior creditors to oppose the sale in court, overturn it and
effectuate an auction in lieu.39 The second path of sale takes place through a courtcontrolled bankruptcy case. Upon the filing for bankruptcy, an automatic stay is
imposed against all debt collection, including the foreclosure on collateral.

In

addition, fresh financing and trade credit are accorded super-priority status.40 A
court-appointed trustee takes control of the firm in order to auction its assets. The
36

Oliver Hart, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 174-8 (1995).
Due to my nonexistent skills in deciphering any Swedish text, the description of the Swedish
model that unfolds herein is based on its description in English in B. Espen-Eckbo & Karin S.
Thorburn, Overbidding vs. Fire-Sales in Bankruptcy Auctions, ¶ 3.1 (hereinafter: Espen-Eckbo &
Thorburn, Fire-Sales), http://ssrn.com/abstract=299384 (2002).
38
Espen-Eckbo & Thorburn note that only 4 cases of successful compositions were reported in
comparison to 300 bankruptcy filings for 1,650 financially distressed firms. See Karin S. Thorburn,
Bankruptcy Auctions: Costs, Debt Recovery, and Firm Survival, 58 J. Fin. Econ. 337, 342 (referring to
B. Espen-Eckbo & Karin S. Thorburn, unpublished manuscript (2000).)
39
Empirically, pre-pack sales are hardly ever overturned. Espen-Eckbo & Thorburn, Fire-Sales,
supra n.37.
40
In practice, firms generate most of their bankruptcy financing through trade credit rather than
through financial credit. Id.
37
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auction normally takes place within several weeks of the bankruptcy filing. The
firm’s assets are auctioned by the trustee either as a going-concern, usually in the
form of a merger into a surviving corporation, or piecemeal. The consideration
offered in the auction must be in cash. The creditors are paid out of the auction’s
proceeds in strict adherence to the absolute priority rule.

b. The Virtues of Bankruptcy Auctions
i.

Obtaining the True Value of the Firm

An auction approach to the solution of corporate distress is predicated on pure
economic theory. Classic auction theory, developed by Vickrey and later Weber and
Milgrom, holds that auctions, whether conducted as open English auctions, Dutch
auctions, or sealed bids auctions,41 generate the true value of the good being
auctioned.42 Bulow and Klemperer showed that the competition existent in an auction
makes this procedure preferable to a privately negotiated sale, notwithstanding the
bargaining skills and control of the seller.43 Under auction theory, an auction-based
bankruptcy system substitutes a market valuation of a debtor corporation for a
mechanism of private bargaining over the value between the existing groups of
investors alone.44
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, prominent law and economics scholars, the
most vocal of whom has been Douglas Baird, advocated consistently for the repeal of
the U.S. Chapter 11’s private bargaining approach to reorganization in favor of an
auction regime.45 Indeed, valuing the future performance of a corporation is complex.

41

An English auction is an open, ascending auction, where the price is successively raised until
eventually a bidder wins as the highest bidder. A Dutch auction is the reverse: an open, descending
auction, where the price is successively reduced by the auctioneer until the first bidder calls out that she
is willing to meet that price. A sealed-bid auction is one where each bidder places her bid without
knowledge of the others' bids, and the highest bidder wins the auction. That winner will pay its
original highest bid (under the first-price sealed-bid model) or the second highest bidder's bid (under
the second-price sealed-bid model). See Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature, 13
J. Econ. Surveys 227 (1999).
42
See William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J.
Fin. 8 (1961); Robert J. Weber & Paul R. Milgrom, A Theory of Auction and Competitive Bidding, 50
Econometrica 1089 (1982); Paul Milgrom, Auction and Bidding: A Primer, 3 J. of Econ. Persp. 3
(1989). See also Robert Wilson, A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition, 44 Rev. of Econ. Stud. 511
(1977) (claiming that in sealed bids, assuming true competition, the seller will receive the true value
even if that value is not known prior to the bidding).
43
Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Auction Versus Negotiation, 86 Am. Econ. Rev. 180
(1996).
44
Jackson, supra note 21, 221-24; Adler, supra note 11, at 347 ; Roe, supra note 31 at 559.
45
The classic papers developing an auction approach to corporate bankruptcy are Baird, Uneasy
Case, supra n.3; Jensen, supra n. 31, at 29-32. Baird's auction approach for bankruptcy received later
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It involves the making of assumptions, projecting the income stream based on those
assumptions, and then multiplying the projected income by the probabilities of
meeting the projections. Under auction theory, the optimal valuation of the firm
would be obtained by leaving the valuation task to the forces of the market. Put
simply, the auction-based bankruptcy proponents call for placing the firm in the hands
of the user that assigns the highest value thereto. That user may be one or more of the
groups of creditors of the corporation, the old equityholders, or a third-party. A
privately-bargained plan allocates the corporate assets solely to the persons with
whom the proponent negotiated and struck a deal. Usually, those persons will be
preexisting creditors or equityholders. But such persons may not be the best users of
the corporate assets. Obtaining the efficient allocation of resources in the context of
corporate reorganization requires a process in which any prospective user of the
corporate resources may bid and propose to take control of the corporation. A general
invitation to bid on the corporate assets and their future use is embodied in the process
of an auction. 46

ii.

Avoiding a Judicial Valuation of the Firm

The proponents of the auction model of corporate reorganization highlight a
crucial institutional shortcoming of the privately-bargained reorganization prototype.
In a private-bargaining reorganization, after the proponent of the plan presented the
underlying valuation on which the plan is based and although the creditors vote on the
proposed plan, the ultimate decision on the acceptance of the plan with its underlying
valuation is to be made by a bankruptcy judge upon confirmation of the plan.47 In
contrast, in an auction-based regime, no institution is called upon to value the
support from Robert G. Hansen & Randall S. Thomas, Auctions in Bankruptcy: Theoretical Analysis
and Practical Guidance, 18 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 159 (1998). Cf. William H. Meckling, Financial
Markets, Default and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, 41 L. & Contemp. Prob. 13, 37-38 (1977).
46
Frank Easterbrook casts some serious doubts concerning the theory that auctions are supreme
to reorganization under chapter 11 in reducing social costs. Easterbrook points to the lack of resort to
(prebankruptcy) auctions by creditors and the complete disregard of the auction alternative during the
extensive and elaborate legislation process of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, including by
representatives lending institutions as indicators that despite the academic call for auctioning insolvent
firms, the legal chapter 11 course might be economically preferable. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Is
Chapter 11 Efficient, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 411 (1990). Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1982) (arguing that given the sunk costs
of an initial bidder for the control of a firm in a tender offer, imposing on management an affirmative
duty to auction the firm following this initial bid adversely affects ex ante the incentives of any
prospective (initial) bidder to invest in information for acquisition of the firm and thus reduces efficient
monitoring of the firm's agents, to the detriment of investors).
47
See, e.g., Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a) (U.S.); Insolvency Act, 1986 § 4A(6) (U.K.).
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corporate debtor. That mission is left exclusively to the free forces of the market.
Many have questioned the competence of judges to make such complex valuation
judgments and accordingly support a market-based bankruptcy prototype.48
Nonetheless, certain recent articles counter this argument by contending that holding
market-based sales in bankruptcy entail expensive and lengthy procedures comparable
to the average cost and time a typical Chapter 11 bargaining takes49 and that such
sales are conducted as fire-sales generating prohibitively low returns for the
creditors.50

iii.

Countering Management's Control Leverage

By placing the firm for sale on the open market an auction-based bankruptcy
regime achieves another, albeit related, constructive goal. It removes much of the
distorted leverage that management and equityholders gain by entering the gates of
the U.S. private-bargaining regime of Chapter 11.51 When an auction takes place, any
group of interest, including creditors, old equityholders or management is subject to
the exact same rules of the bidding game as any outside bidder. Put differently, in an
auction regime management and equityholders do not gain any personal advantages
that other groups of interest would be denied.52 In an auction regime, commencing
reorganization does not provide the old management a safe-haven in which they enjoy
the upper hand in negotiations and may stall the proceedings until they are likely to
obtain the creditors' concessions and emerge once again at the helm of the corporate
48

Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17 J. L. Econ. & Org.
(2001);Baird, supra note 11; Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits
of the Judicial Process, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 75 (1995); But see Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in
Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory Design, 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 559 (2001) (arguing that
the drafting of the Bankruptcy Code to include muddy rules that leave wide discretion to the
bankruptcy judges increases the costs of non-cooperative behavior and thus promotes a cooperative
resolution of the debtor’s financial distress).
49
See Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy, Yale ICF Working Paper
No. 04-13 (2004), full text available for download at http://ssrn.com/abstract=523562.
50
See Todd Pulvino, Do Asset Fire Sales Exist? An Empirical Investigation of Commercial
Aircraft Transactions, 53 J. Fin. 939 (1998). Cf. Per Stromberg, Conflicts of Interest and Market
Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests, 55 J. Fin. 2641 (2000).
51
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, Bargaining and the Division of Value in
Corporate Reorganization, 8 J. L. Econ. & Org. 253, 255-6 (1992) (arguing that such distortions
include: (a) equityholders' ability to prolong the proceedings and threaten the recovery of the creditors
by exposing the firm to additional costs and losses while in bankruptcy, and (b) their extracting value
in exchange for foregoing their "option rights" to receive value from the debtor (this "option" exists
because the value of the firm remains uncertain as there is no actual realization of assets in
reorganization)).
52
Cf. Barry E. Adler & George G. Triantis, The Aftermath of North LaSalle Street, 70 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 1225, 1233-1238 (2002) (discussing the strong benefits management can enjoy by deviations from
absolute priority).
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business. Once commenced, the auction regime leads to an open competition among
bidders over the control of the firm. It follows, then, that the early decision whether
to enter reorganization or liquidation is free of any strategic planning by management
and equityholders.

Any dilemma, involving genuine business or strategic

considerations, is eliminated. The only decision to be made is to enter bankruptcy.
What course the bankruptcy case will follow is clear.

The corporation will be

auctioned, and the bidders will determine whether the corporation will be sold as a
going-concern or whether its assets will be sold piecemeal. However, it should be
noted that the neutralization of private management's benefits in reorganization is not
limited exclusively to an auction based bankruptcy regime. Although a managementcontrolled private bargaining reorganization, as Chapter 11, entails the management
leverage problem, theoretically a trustee-controlled private bargaining regime quashes
this problem as well.53

2.

The Homogeneous Options Proposals

One of the more troubling features of bankruptcy bargaining is that it entails a
bargaining among divergent groups of claims and interests.54 Based on their senior or
junior priority of distribution, these groups hold heterogeneous interests which are
likely to be reflected in their bargaining positions.55 Arguably, the heterogeneity
problem impairs the integrity of bargaining over a bankrupt firm as well as its
efficacy. Indeed, in his call for auctions, Baird makes it quite clear that auctions, as a
market based valuation system, not only facilitate the allocation of the corporate
assets to their most efficient user (the highest bidder), but also separate the question of
distribution of the proceeds of the sale among the corporate creditors from the
question of future deployment of the assets.56
53

Thus, auctions remove the

See Hahn, supra n.35, at 132-133. Cf. David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of
Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1325 (1998) (distinguishing between
management-displacing and management-controlled bankruptcy regimes).
54
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy,
51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 97 (1984).
55
See Part I.A.1 supra.
56
Baird, Auctions Revised, supra note 33, at 638. But see Sugato Bhattacharyya & Rajdeep
Singh, The Resolution of Bankruptcy by Auction, 54 J. Fin. Econ. 269 (1999) (criticizing this argument
and emphasizing that "each market-based sales mechanism has its own specific distributional
attributes, over which different claimants have distinct preferences. Just as current bankruptcy
resolution procedures engender claimant conflicts over reorganization plans, the proposed auctionbased resolutions, which seek to maintain adherence to APR [absolute priority rule – D.H.], will
engender claimant conflicts over specific selling mechanisms." Thus, they assert that "given inherent
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heterogeneity problem from the resolution of a bankrupt firm's fate. Other scholars
have offered other innovative models for corporate bankruptcy, which are intended
primarily to overcome the valuation distortions and heterogeneous interests that are
inherent in private bargaining. Mark Roe proposed that a bankrupt firm would issue
ten percent (10%) of new common stock through the market and extrapolate its value
through this issue.57 Lucian Bebchuk offered another innovative approach, under
which upon bankruptcy the original rights of all existing claimholders and
equityholders of the firm would be extinguished. Rather, the senior secured claims
would receive in lieu all the equity stake in the firm, while the junior creditors and
equityholders would be issued buy-out options. Thereupon, starting with the most
junior class (that is, old equityholders) each class would be entitled to exercise its
options, under the terms of which the holders may buy out the more senior classes at
the value of latter's original claims. Should a class abstain from exercising its option
it would lose any stake it had in the firm and the rights would shift to the senior class
ranking immediately ahead of the abstaining class.58

Building on the Bebchuk

Proposal, Aghion, Hart and Moore proposed to combine the buy-out options issued to
existing claimholders and equityholders with a subsequent vote by the new
equityholders (that is, the exercised options) on market bids for the bankrupt firm.59
Both the Bebchuk Proposal and the AHM Proposal convert all the divergent claims
and interests into a newly homogeneous class of equity interests. By so doing these
Proposals join Baird's auction model in that they dispense with the heterogeneity
problem.

II.

Concentrated Banking and Corporate Financing

inter-claimant conflict in this regard, it is likely that an independent court can add value to the process,
over and above what could be contractually achieved by the affected parties.")
57
Roe, supra note 31(hereinafter: The Roe Proposal) See also Roe, supra n.8 (asserting the
general preference for market-based regimes).
58
Bebchuk, supra note 22 (hereinafter: The Bebchuk Proposal).
59
Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, & John Moore, The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J. L.
Econ. & Org. 523 (1992); Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, & John Moore, Improving Bankruptcy
Procedure, 72 Wash. U. L. Q. 849 (1994) (hereinafter: The AHM Proposal). AHM later published an
alternative version to their principle proposition. Under the alternate version, the newly issued buy-out
options would apply only to former unsecured claims and equityholders, while the old secured claims
would remain intact. In addition, an official bankruptcy appointee would be appointed (a trustee or
receiver) who would then propose a single reorganization plan to the (new) equityholders of the firm,
with no active auction soliciting external bids taking place. Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, & John
Moore, Insolvency Reform in the UK: A Revised Proposal, 11 Insol. L. & Practice 4 (1995).
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The previous part deliberately assumed that countries around the world
operate under similar economic conditions. Thus, the theoretical analysis of the
various bankruptcy models disregarded specific idiosyncratic characteristics of
specific economies. This part relaxes the homogeneous economies assumption. In
particular, it differentiates between economies based on their characteristic channels
for financing business firms. The following part will build on the characteristics of
certain markets developed in this part and examine which of the various models of
bankruptcy law is most compatible for those markets.

A.

Concentrated Banking Economies

The structure of local capital markets varies significantly. Certain markets are
more developed while others are considered developing.

Corporate governance

around the world is divergent and, despite an international agenda for reform and
implementation of prototypical principles,60 is largely shaped by the conditions and
the characteristics of the particular capital markets in which its rules apply.61
Economic studies highlight the distinctions between concentrated and dispersed
ownership markets.62 Dispersed ownership markets are capital markets in which, by
and large, firms raise capital through an active stock exchange from dispersed
investors, ranging from small private investors to large financial institutions. In such
markets, the dispersion of investors encourages competition among the financing
sources of firms. That is, the basic conditions pertaining to a firm's access to finance
are such that it can shop around between different types of investors and different
types of financial instruments for its most appropriate package of financing. Yet
many small economies around the world lack these attributes.63 Such economies

60

See,
e.g.,
OECD
Principles
of
Corporate
Governance
(2004),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf. For trends of reform within leading OECD
members, see Corporate Governance in OECD Member Countries: Recent Developments and Trends
(Revised) (2000), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/2/1932036.pdf .
61
See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. Fin. 737
(1997); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and
Barrieers to Global Cross Reference, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND
DIVERSITY 23 (J. McCahery et al. ed., Oxford 2002)
62
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership
Around the World, 54 J. Fin. 471 (1999).
63
Beck, Demigruc-Kunt and Levine find that poorly developed markets are found primarily in
traditional French civil law countries, while traditional common law countries enjoying strong
protection of shareholders rights, good accounting regulations and low levels of corruption tend to be
more market based countries. Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, Law,
Endowments and Finance, 70 J. Fin Econ 137 (2003).
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often correspond to the concentrated ownership market prototype.64

Moreover, these

markets are characterized by a capital market in which a few financial institutions
dominate the supply of finance to the entire local market. Because these financial
institutions are often banks, and the capital supply is primarily intermediate debt
instruments,65 these markets are referred to as concentrated banking markets66 or bank
dominated markets.67

Indeed, there is a strong correlation between concentrated

banking and the lack of a well-developed securities market in a given economy.68

64

The tentative impression from the discussion of various corporate governance regimes might
be that it is an issue that is relevant for listed corporations, whose stock is publicly traded through an
active stock exchange. Yet, from a normative and policy perspective, the structure of a market's
corporate governance bears important ramifications for closely-held corporations as well, as it affects
their potential to raise equity capital by going public. See Charles Oman, Steven Fries & Willem
Buiter, Corporate Governance in Developing, Transition and Emerging-Market Economies, OECD
DEVELOPMENT CENTRE Policy Brief No. 23 (2003), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/49/28658158.pdf.
65
Banks are considered intermediaries between the firms in a market and the capital required for
the latter's operations. Correspondingly, bank financing is dubbed intermediate debt, as opposed to
bonds and other securities issued by the firm or direct lending by non-bankers – the non-intermediated
debt. See Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51 Rev. Econ.
Stud. 393 (1984).
66
See Mark J. Roe, Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 10, 44
(1991); Eric J. Gouvin, Cross-Border Bank Branching Under the NAFTA: Public Choice and the Law
of Corporate Groups, 13 Conn. J. Int'l L. 257,258 (1999); Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Potential Risks of
Nationwide Consolidation in the Banking Industry: A Reply to Professor Miller, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 1133,
1143-4 (1992). Cf. Eric J. Gouvin, Banking in North America: The Triumph of Public Choice over
Public Policy, 32 Cornell Int'l L.J. 1, 3 (1998) (describing concentrated banking markets as "markets in
which banking organizations are free to offer a broad range of financial services"); Eric J. Gouvin, The
Political Economy of Canada's "Widely Held" Rule for Large Banks, 32 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 391
(2001); E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks,
77 Iowa L. Rev. 957 (1992)
67
For a focused comparative study on bank domination in the U.S., Japan and Germany, see
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A
Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 73 (1995). See
also Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States,
102 Yale L.J. 1927 (1993) (observing the control of German and Japanese firms by large domestic
financial institutions such as the banks through the holding of large blocks of stocks of these firms).
For a general empirical comparison between market-based and bank-based financial systems, and the
relation between each system and economic development of countries, see Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Ross
Levine, Bank-based and Market-based Financial Systems - Cross-Country Comparisons, The World
Bank Finance Development Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper WPS 2143 (July 1999),
available at http://econ.worldbank.org/docs/323.pdf.
68
See,
e.g.,
Amy
Chunyan
Wu,
PRC's
Commercial
Banking
System:
Is Universal Banking a Better Model?, 37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 623, 638 (1999) (stating that
"Corporate sectors throughout Asia rely more on bank finance and less on equity than Western
markets. China's enterprises are not exceptions.") William L. Horton, Jr. The Perils of Universal
Banking in Central and Eastern Europe, 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 683, 694 (1995) (describing the limited
function the German securities market plays in financing the local private sector as compared to the
prevalent bank financing); Skeel & Cheffins, supra note 35 (discussing the equilibrium between
concentrated equity ownership and concentrated debt markets on one hand, and dispersed equity
ownership and dispersed (non-intermediated) debt markets on the other hand); Mark G. Guzman, Bank
Structure, Capital Accumulation and Growth: A Simple Macroeconomic Model, 16 Econ. Theory 421
(2000).
For a meticulously constructed spreadsheet compiling data from 175 countries around the world
concerning, inter alia, the relative size of banking activity compared to local securities markets, see
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Bank financing provides the lion's share of the total financing in these markets. Thus,
the dependency of players in the local commercial activity on bank financing could
not be stronger.

B.

The Efficacy and Perils of Concentrated Banking

The ubiquity of concentrated banking begs the question whether such a market
structure is efficient or rather value-reducing for an economy.

Based on data

compiled primarily in the U.S., early studies that examined the relationship between
concentrated banking and lending efficacy reached conflicting conclusions.

For

example, Guzman concluded that overall a bank monopoly is liable to lead to credit
rationing and manipulate the rates of interest on loans and deposits.69 Also, Cetorelli
argued that strong banking concentration presents entry barriers for entrepreneurs in
non-financial sectors.70 In short, these studies concluded that highly concentrated
banking adversely affects the credit market and increases the overall cost of capital.
Yet, other studies highlighted the positive effects of concentration on the banks'
efficient screening of borrowers' credit profiles and the banks' overall stability. For
example, Petersen and Rajan emphasize that in concentrated banking, banks are more
likely to assist small firms in financing as the banks develop relationships with those
firms and plan on recovering the profits at a later stage.71

Marquez points to more

efficient borrower screening in concentrated banking and the negative effects of
information asymmetries and low screening (adverse selection) in dispersed
banking.72 In addition, Beck, Demigruc-Kunt and Levine demonstrate that

Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Ross Levine, A New Database on Financial Development and
Structure, The World Bank Finance Development Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper
WPS
2146
(July
1999,
as
updated
2003),
available
at
http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/structure_database.xls;
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/607_wps2146.pdf.
69
Guzman, supra n.68 .
70
Nicola Cetorelli, Real Effects of Bank Competition, 36 J. of Money, Credit and Banking 543
(2004). Cf. Sandra E. Black & Phillip E. Strahan, Entrepreneurship and Bank Credit Availability, 57 J.
Fin. 2807 (2002); Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti and Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Bank Competition and Firm
Creation, International Monetary Fund, Working paper WP/01/21 (2001), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp0121.pdf.
71
Mitchell A. Petersen and Raghuram G. Rajan, The Effect of Credit Markets Competition on
Lending Relationship, 110 Quart. J. Econ. 407 (1995).
72
Robert Marquez, Competition, Adverse Selection, and Information Dispersion in the Banking
Industry, 15 Rev. Fin. Stud. 901 (2002). Cf. Tullio Jappelli and Marco Pagano, Information Sharing in
Credit Markets: International Evidence, R-371 Inter American Development Bank, Research
Department, June (1999) (supporting empirically theoretical predictions that information sharing
among lending institutions reduces both adverse selection and moral hazard problems and thus improve
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concentrated banking contributes to the stability of the banking industry and reduces
the risks of a general banking crisis.73

However, in a recent extensive, global,

empirical study, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic show that overall bank
concentration increases financing obstacles and decreases the likelihood of receiving
bank finance, with this result proving to be particularly strong in countries with less
developed institutions, a small share of foreign-owned banks and a relatively high
level of government interference in the banking sector.74 Similar findings have been
recorded by Cetorelli and Strahan, who conclude that concentration of market power
by banks presents a significant entry barrier for the entrepreneurial sector of an
economy.75 Nonetheless, Cetorelli has emphasized the basic trade-off inherent in the
structure of the banking industry: while more competition is likely to lead to a larger
quantity of credit on one hand, accumulation of market power should increase a
bank's incentives to produce information on prospective borrowers and lead to higher
quality of screening the applicants on the other hand.76
With respect to the primary question whether concentrated banking is overall
efficient or whether its regressive effects on borrower firms outweigh its economic

credit availability for borrowers). On the role of banks as information accumulators and efficient
monitors for all investors, see Diamond, supra n. 65.
73
Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine, Bank Concentration and Crises,
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3041 (2003), available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/26276_wps3041.pdf However, they also find that banking regulation
which restricts the banking activity solely to the financial sector limits the banks' diversification and
thus increases to an extent the overall crisis risk. Nonetheless, the authors find that countries that adopt
policies which encourage competition throughout the economy are less likely to suffer from a systemic
banking failure. Cf. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Competition and Financial Stability, (March 24th,
2003),
available
at
http://www.worldbank.org/research/interest/confs/042003/cfs_032403.pdf
(demonstrating that the competition-stability trade-off in the structure of the banking industry is
applicable in certain situations, but not all).
74
See Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic, Bank Competition and
Access to Finance: International Evidence, 36 J. Money, Credit and Banking 627 (2004). Cf. Rafael La
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Government Ownership of Banks, (2000),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=236434 (finding a strong banking
concentration in countries whose banking industry is dominated by governmental ownership).
75
Nicola Cetorelli & Phillip E. Strahan, Finance as a Barrier to Entry: Bank Competition and
Industry Structure in Local U.S. Markets, NBER Working Paper No. W10832 (October 2004),
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10832.pdf; cf. Marriane Bertrand, Antoinette Schoar & David Thesmar,
Banking Deregulation and Industry Structure: Evidence from the French Banking Reforms of 1985,
C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, 4488 (2004), available at http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4488.asp
(finding that distortions in bank lending as a result of the banking structure create artificial barriers to
entry in the real sectors of the economy).
76
Nicola Cetorelli, Competition among Banks: Good or Bad?, 2Q Econ. Persp., 38 (2001). Cf.
Nicola Cetorelli and Pietro F. Peretto, Oligopoly Banking and Capital Accumulation, Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago, Working Paper No. 2000-12 (2000); Nicola Cetorelli and Michele Gambera, Banking
Market Structure, Financial Dependence and Growth: International Evidence from Industry Data, 56
J. of Fin. 627 (2001).
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benefits this paper takes no assertive position.77 Rather, it assumes that concentrated
banking is a widespread phenomenon that typifies the market structure of many
economies throughout the world. Nonetheless, the following part will expose certain
adverse effects caused by concentrated banking within the specific context of
corporate reorganizations. Even assuming that for certain economies, specifically
small ones, the macroeconomic overall account leans in favor of a concentrated
banking structure of their market, one ought not to avoid the search for legal
measurements which may reduce the adverse effects of concentrated banking.78 Thus,
Part IV will propose the adoption of a reorganization regime which ameliorates the
adverse effects of concentrated banking on corporate reorganizations.

III.
A.

Concentrated Banking and Bankruptcy

Private Bargaining Reorganizations
The general analysis of private bargaining reorganization regimes in Part I

emphasized that its main flaw is the murkiness of the firm's valuation associated
therewith. As shown, this distortion undermines the credibility and reliability of
private bargaining reorganizations. However, it has also been suggested that the
appointment of an external, objective, trustee to control the reorganization
negotiations is likely to amend the valuation distortion and enhance the integrity of
private bargaining reorganizations.79
And yet, a closer examination of a valuation process championed by a trustee
reveals the fallacy of a blind reliance on its outcome. The reliability of a trusteeordered valuation is greatly impaired in concentrated banking markets. That is, in
countries where the supply of credit is dominated by few large credit institutions, the
trustee is less independent (and hence neutral) than theoretically presumed.
Concentrated debt economies suffer from the lack of sufficient competition over
corporate financing.

As stated earlier, the financing sources of businesses in
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For the general dilemma concerning whether competition or the lack thereof is the superior
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dismantling altogether).
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See Part I.A.2 supra.
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concentrated banking economies is predominantly bank lending.80 The effect of the
(few) banks' domination is multifold. First, at the inception of the reorganization
case, the banks appear in court as holders of the largest and senior claims and propose
their nominee as trustee. Secondly, because the corporation is in dire need of fresh
capital to finance its rescue venture, its management will most likely acquiesce to the
banks' nominee. As a result of these two factors, it is common practice for the courts
to appoint as trustee the banks' and corporation's (common) nominee. In practice, the
courts follow the pattern of liquidation cases and appoint lawyers or accountants to
fill this role. In small economies the number of experienced practitioners in corporate
reorganizations is relatively small. Thus, the trustees are usually repeat players.81
The banks tend to nominate those practitioners who have best served the banks'
interests in previous cases.82 Thus, it is rather naïve to expect the trustee to exercise a
neutral and independent valuation, which may at times upset the bank (as an
interested party), when the trustee's appointment in future cases is at stake.83 For the
same reason, neither should one rely enthusiastically on the trustee's negotiations with
the banks concerning the restructuring of the latter's debt as representing the best
interests of the corporation as a whole. In short, the process of appointing a trustee in
reorganization cases does not solve the biased valuation problem.

B.

Cash Auctions
At first, the call for implementing an auction regime in corporate bankruptcy

appeared to rest on strong theoretical grounds. The economic logic underlying this
proposal is clear and simple. However, this proposal assumes the existence of certain
economic conditions. Most importantly, it assumes market perfection.84 Under the
80
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For the effect of acting as repeat players in numerous Chapter 11 cases on the law firms
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condition of a perfect market, any potential bidder in the auction has no limitation in
raising the necessary financing for making the bid. In other words, all bidders have
free access to cash. Indeed, the so-called auction approach to bankruptcy is more
accurately a cash auction approach.85 It assumes cash money will be placed on the
table for purchasing the firm from its creditors and the winning bidder will purchase
the corporation free of its old debt. However, as correctly observed by Hart and
Aghion, when one assumes away financing market perfection, and introduces cashconstrained bidders as a factor of reality, the efficacy of the bankruptcy cash auction
is severely eroded.86

Commentators acknowledged that where bidders face cash

constraints, the good being auctioned may be allocated to the bidder whose financial
strength is supreme although that bidder may not be the highest-value user.87 For
example, Shleifer and Vishny point out that the financial distress of a firm may appear
during an industry wide financial crisis, in which case the most natural bidders for the
firm, its industry counterparts, are cash constrained as well. In such circumstances the
number of bidders is likely to be low, which in turn calls into question the benefits of
having an auction in the first place.88

Thus, while the cash auction model for

bankruptcy holds for perfect capital markets, imperfections in the supply of cash
eradicate the justification for such a regime.89 In addition, AHM argued that cash

assets). As firms shrink from the megafirms usually considered in auction proposals, the healthy
market assumption becomes more questionable. In samples consisting of small and mid-sized firms,
auctions may be of little use”); Skeel, supra n.9, at 226 (the law-and-economics proposals for replacing
Chapter 11 all depend on the assumption of smoothly functioning markets).
85
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bidders for financially distressed large firms would effectively take the firm private.
As a result, the bidder would face a great risk-bearing due to potential future
fluctuation in the firm's value. It follows then, that bidders would charge for this riskbearing by discounting their cash bids, thus frustrating the goal of ex post
maximization of firm's value.90
Nonetheless, an apparent response to the cash constraint objection to cash
auctions might be the traditional law-and-economics argument that cash is assumed to
be available for actors in the market, either from their own resources or by raising
(debt or equity) capital for financing the desired project.91 In economies where the
local equity markets are underdeveloped, for a cash auction bankruptcy regime to be
operable the raising of cash would naturally turn the potential bidders to debt
financing, and specifically to bank loans. Thus, an analysis of the position of the
banks, as the default choice for financing a realistic bid on a financially distressed
firm, is critical for assessing the efficacy of the cash auction model for corporate
bankruptcy in such economies. Focusing on the interaction between potential bidders
for the distressed firm and financing banks, the following sections expose several
major obstacles which impede efficient financing of cash bids by banks. The first
obstacle is derived from the divergent interests and investment preferences of any
bidder on one hand and any bank on the other. The second and third obstacles are a
result of the distortions caused by a concentrated banking structure.

1.

The Divergent Preferences: Financing Conservatism

As noted earlier, in concentrated banking markets the channel of equity
financing for firms is characteristically underdeveloped.92 Indeed, in concentrated
banking economies the banks are the major suppliers of credit and the overall
financing for firms.

It follows then, that the banks are often involved in the

bankruptcy case not only as a potential financer of bidders, but also as a major
creditor of the corporate debtor. In such economies, a bank is invariably a senior
90
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secured creditor.93 The bank's position as a major secured creditor is likely to affect
its discretion whether to finance a bid for the auctioned firm and for what amount.
Like every other creditor, the bank is interested in being paid on its prebankruptcy
claim. Thus, the bank has a natural self-interest to increase the amount of financing it
advances to the bidders, so that the financing will pay off the bank's own claim. In
other words, in financing a bid on the firm the bank is effectively paying itself
through a process of retiring its preexisting claim by the creation of a new claim. The
result of this effect is that to the extent its claim is undersecured, the bank's position as
a major secured creditor of the firm drives its financing of a bid on the auctioned firm
up towards the amount of the bank's prebankruptcy claim. To illustrate, consider
Firm, whose debt to Bank is 100 and its debt to other creditors is also 100. All of
Firm's assets are collateralized to Bank through a blanket lien. Firm is in bankruptcy
and is being auctioned off. Bidder approaches Bank and asks for cash financing for
the purpose of purchasing Firm. Bidder values Firm at 70. Under Bidder's valuation,
Bank is undersecured. In such a scenario, Bank is likely to use its influence and
persuade Bidder to bid higher.94 By increasing Bidder's bid to, say, 80 Bank is both
improving its own present payback from Firm,95 and entering a newly negotiated
credit of 80 into its own financial statements (that is, refinancing the original loan)
rather than listing the old debt as uncollectible debt.96
When Bank is oversecured, however, the financing environment is liable to
change for Bidder. Assume now that Bidder values Firm at 150 and asks Bank to
finance a bid of such amount for Firm. As any lender would act, Bank obviously
weighs the Bidder's prospects of timely paying back the loan. This requires Bank to
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consider the Bidder's financial stability and its projected use of the credit supplied
(that is, its use of Firm), as well as exogenous factors which are likely to affect
Bidder's liquidity. Bank computes the risk factor of this particular financing and
charges Bidder with an interest rate proportionally. However, as the amount of the
financing requested increases there comes a point where the increase of the risk of
default outweighs any increase of the feasible interest rate a borrower is capable of
handling. Thus, Bank will not necessarily finance Bidder for any amount requested.
Bank will not risk its money and finance Bidder for 150 even if Bank itself values
Firm similarly. Banks are lenders who take precautionary measures to hedge the risks
associated with credit. A favorable position for any bank is being an oversecured
lender.97 That is, banks prefer providing credit which is collateralized by a pool of
assets the value of which exceeds the amount of credit provided. This equity cushion
serves to reduce future risks of default as a result of a substantial increase of the
borrower's total liabilities or a devaluation of the borrower's total assets.

Thus,

returning to the example above, even where Bidder can convince Bank that its
valuation of Firm is reasonable, Bank will provide Bidder with actual financing which
is lower than 150 to ensure the maintaining of an equity cushion in Firm's assets. An
extraction of the above example can illustrate how this can undermine achieving the
goal of value maximization. Assume that Bidder B approaches Bank and asks it to
finance a bid for Firm for 140 (which is Bidder B's valuation). Assume further that
Bank's own valuation is closer to Bidder A (that is, 150), but that Bank prefers leaving
an equity cushion of 20 in the collateralized assets (that is, Firm's assets). Thus, Bank
is willing to finance bids for Firm by releasing a credit of only 130. In this case, both
Bidder A and Bidder B stand on par to gain Bank's credit, even though Bidder A is
the highest-valuing user of Firm.98 It follows then, that once the gap between the
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bidders' valuation and the banks' self-imposed cap on financing is exposed it becomes
apparent that the goal of maximizing the value of the debtor firm is unattainable
through cash auctions.
The financing conservatism phenomenon is a typical financing approach
which banks adopt.99 The self-imposed cap on the amount a bank is likely to finance
is applicable in low- and high competitive banking environments. In underdeveloped
equity markets, this natural bank conservatism cannot be off-set by the potential of
bidders obtaining financing elsewhere. Because equity financing is barely a viable
option in such economies, bank loans rule the financing market. The banks' selfrestraint on financing creates a smoke screen through which the signal of the highestvaluing user of the financially distressed firm cannot be amplified and thus received
by the selling creditors.
Moreover, in underdeveloped equity markets, the absolute dependency of
bidders on bank financing makes the outcome of the auction one which is completely
dependent on the financing bank's valuation of the auctioned firm, rather than on the
bidder's valuations.100 As explained in the preceding paragraphs, a lender cannot be
relied on to serve as the efficient screener of the various bidders. Because of its cap
on financing, a lender may not necessarily pick the highest-valuing user. Thus,
entrusting the screening of cash auction bids and selecting the winning bid exclusively
in the hands of the financing bank might fail to obtain this scheme's policy goals. A
bank's financing of the auction is liable to curtail efficient value-maximizing
competition, as this competition is capped by the bank's lender conservatism.
2.

Oligopoly and Conscious Parallelism

By definition, in a typical concentrated banking market the banking industry in
general and the leading dominant banks in particular form an oligopoly.101
Economists acknowledge that one cannot identify one single prevailing "theory of
oligopoly".102 A prediction of oligopoly behavior in a certain industry cannot be
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seriously considered reliable unless it is predicated on specific assumptions pertaining
to that oligopolistic environment.103 In this vein, the troubling question in antitrust
law has always been when should oligopolies be subjected to legal scrutiny. Should
their mere existence subject them to regulative limitations, or need there be some
overt act to substantiate a coordinated anticompetitive practice? Traditional antitrust
law has particularly targeted explicit agreements which formed organized cartels, but
demonstrated a lax approach to covert cooperation among competitors.104
Nonetheless, in an oligopolistic market the potential for harmful anticompetitive
behavior indeed exists one way or the other. Moreover, the penalizing of explicit
cartel agreements by antitrust law makes secretive anticompetitive behavior the
preferred course of action for potential conspiring oligopolists.105

But even if

oligopolists act independently of one another, and thus apparently non-cooperatively,
game theory predicts that given certain conditions the oligopolists will act
cooperatively in what is known as conscious parallelism or tacit collusion.106 That is,
each party is acting independently to maximize its own wealth through high-pricing.
Yet, consciously predicting a similar high-pricing behavior of its rivals and the
parties' interdependence (given the oligopoly structure), then without explicitly
receiving or conveying any communication from (or to) them concerning each other's
behavior, each party continues its high-pricing. As a result, a cooperative,
anticompetitive, equilibrium emerges. Acting on a long term basis, with no certainty
as to the time period in which one of the players will remove itself from a certain
pattern of behavior, often players participate in an infinite repeated game, or
supergame.107 Game theory predicts that the infinite repetition of a game leads to
cooperative behavior among the players.108 However, this general prediction must be
MEASUREMENT 29-33 (2002); Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF
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qualified, as the high-priced anticompetitive practice of the oligopolists creates
incentives for the individual firm to cheat the others, cut its prices below the joint
level and generate larger (short-term) profits as the result of its increased (low-priced)
sales, despite the future retaliation ramifications the firm will suffer from its
counterparts.

Thus, tacit collusion equilibria might prove to be fragile and

unstable.109 A cooperative anticompetitive equilibrium is more likely to emerge and
remain stable over time given the following limiting conditions to the game: (a) any
deviation from cooperation is easily detected and observed by the other parties;110 (b)
the parties can react swiftly to the deviation (e.g. adjust prices); and (c) the nondeviating parties can inflict upon the cheater a severe and effective punishment.111
Detection of deviations from a common practice, coordination and infliction of a
penalty on the cheating party is mostly effective as the number of the players in the
game is lower.112 As the number of players increases coordination entails greater
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costs and the personal stake of each party in the harm caused by the cheater is smaller.
It follows then, that assuming the existence of the aforementioned qualifying
conditions, oligopolistic industries with a low number of dominant players are
susceptible to anticompetitive cooperative behavior.113
As noted in Part II, this article takes concentrated banking as a given, and
appreciates that there may be significant virtues in such a structure of the banking
industry for certain economies. Nonetheless, in certain respects, the oligopolistic
structure of concentrated banking can tag the banks with the label of suspects of tacit
collusion. To the extent that tacit collusion by the banks can be deduced from their
subtle interests and supported by pointing to the existence of game theory's
cooperative facilitating conditions, a legal response is justified albeit not one which
calls for restructuring the banking industry lest we throw out the baby with the bath
water. The following paragraphs will demonstrate that tacit collusion may indeed be
a troubling concern in concentrated banking and highlight the negative effects that
bank financing of cash bids for the acquisition of a financially distressed firm might
carry as a result thereof. Namely, these negative effects are (a) the direct costs of the
banks' credit and (b) the hazard of a systematic squeezing-out of junior creditors.

a.

High-Priced Interest Rates

Purchasing a firm free of its old debt is no cheap transaction. Usually, the
value of paying off the firm's debt is quite significant. For most potential purchasers,
requiring a cash payment for the debtor firm necessarily involves raising cash
themselves as a prerequisite for placing a bid.114 In concentrated banking economies
this means effectively that a potential bidder must first find a financing bank as its
cash source. The banking industry in a concentrated banking economy is effectively
comprised of two to three major banks.115 Even where there are more banks in the
industry, these markets often experience a major dominance of a few leading banks
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which enjoy a strong hold over the financing market.116 Given this strong dominance
and the low number of banks active in such markets, the degree of inter-bank
competition in concentrated banking economies is relatively low. It follows then that
the financing banks are in a classic oligopolistic position. As a result, the financing
that potential bidders are seeking is liable to come at a high cost.117 As oligopolists,
the banks may charge prohibitively high interest rates on their loans.118 Since no
other feasible financing sources exist in these markets, potential bidders may face a
major financing barrier impeding their intent to bid on the firm.

This obstacle

decreases the likelihood that the firm will be sold eventually to its most efficient user.
As studies have shown, it is more likely that the winning bidder will be the one with
better access to bank financing rather than the highest valuing person.119 In short,
while the underlying idea of an auction approach is to use the market by increasing
competition over the firm's value and ensuring its placing in the hands of the highestvaluing user, the financing barrier of concentrated banking undermines the very
competition that a (cash) auction regime is supposed to facilitate.

b.

Squeezing Out Junior Creditors

Adoption of a cash auction regime in concentrated banking economies is
likely to lead to another negative repercussion. As noted earlier, in such economies
the financing bank is invariably also the senior secured creditor of the debtor firm.
However, there exist other creditors as well. Creditors of a common debtor have
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heterogeneous interests.120 The divergent priorities of the creditors' claims affect the
creditors' decision-making. While senior creditors are more apt to promote financial
solutions for the debtor which carry a low net present value, junior creditors
constantly seek solutions which maximize the debtor's value beyond the bounded
horizons of the senior creditor's secured claim.

The following paragraph

demonstrates that in concentrated banking markets, the banks' domination of the
supply side of financing creates a potential hazard of the formation of a bank-bidder
coalition to squeeze-out the debtor's junior creditors through a cash auction. To
clarify this argument, it will be first assumed that a cash auction takes place in a
market with a single monopolist bank. After identifying the interests leading up to the
squeeze-out coalition, the monopoly assumption shall be substituted by the more
realistic banking structure, that of an oligopoly comprised of few dominant banks.
The squeeze-out hazard shall then be analyzed against this state of the banking
industry.

Monopolistic Banking
Consider once again Firm, whose secured debt to Bank is 100 and whose debt
to Unsecured Creditors is also 100.
financing a bid on Firm's assets.

Now assume Bidder approaches Bank for

Bidder values Firm at 150 and thus asks for

financing such a bid. Assume further that Bank, like bidder, values Firm in the hands
of Bidder at 150. The Bank contemplates the financing it is willing to advance to
Bidder accordingly. It has been shown earlier that in any market, concentrated- and
dispersed banking alike, Bank is likely to cap its financing at a figure lower than 150,
say 130.121 However, given now Bank's monopolistic position, it enjoys complete and
exclusive control over the auction.122 Because Bank is the bottleneck through which
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all bids must pass due to all bidders' lack of alternative financing,123 once Bank has
agreed to finance Bidder at a price determined by Bank itself any potential competitor
will find the financing barrier as impenetrable. Bank's effective control of the cash
auction makes it the sole entity to effectively determine the winning bid.124 Bank
considers its options. For Bank and Bidder, two options are possible:
Option I – Bank advances at present financing of 130 for Bidder's bid;
Option II – Bank advances at present financing of 100 for Bidder's bid (i.e.
Stage 1) and reserves the remaining value of 30 for future advances (i.e. for Stage 2).
Option I reflects Bank's own (discounted) valuation of the financially
distressed debtor under the control of Bidder. Admittedly, Bank plans to generate
income on this financing, reflected by the interest rate it charges. If this interest rate
is denoted R, then the income the Bank expects to generate is R*130. However,
advancing the entire 130 to Bidder at this stage renders the entire corporate enterprise
of Firm as fully collateralized. In other words, at the very stage of the bid, Firm's
financing capacity is fully exhausted. The financing of Bidder under Option I stifles
future financing channels for Firm at a time when it is in dire need of additional
funding – upon its emergence from financial distress and return to full scale business
activity.125 Although both Bidder and Bank value Bidder's use of Firm at 150, the
tools available for this use are severely restricted by the early exhaustion of the latter's
credit capacity. This limitation goes against the mutual interests of Bidder and Bank.
Bidder's valuation of Firm cannot be realized without exogenous cash infusions
following its acquisition of the control of Firm. The realistic payback to Bank of its
financing of Bidder's bid (that is, 130*(1+R)) is predicated primarily on the firm's
profits, profits which cannot be gained absent (additional) external financing beyond
Bidder's purchase price.
Bank may enhance its own position, though, coincidentally with that of
Bidder, by opting for Option II. Under Option II, Bank will advance only 100 for the
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bid.126 This limitation of the bid serves well both Bidder and Bank. Bidder acquires
the control of Firm at a discounted price (compared to its own private valuation) and
enjoys an equity cushion of 50 in Firm for future financing. Likewise, Bank enhances
its own payback on its original loan to Firm,127 while simultaneously leaving itself
(the monopolist) an equity cushion to serve as collateral for the (near future) jumpstart financing Firm will most likely require for its emerging from bankruptcy. Stage
2 of the Bank-Bidder overall financing follows shortly after the acquisition of the
control of Firm by Bidder was completed successfully. At this stage, Bank will
advance the additional 30 it was willing to advance all along. By bifurcating the
overall financing and reserving the 30 to Stage 2, Bank and Bidder join forces in
diverting the use of the ultra-Bank-claim value from payout to Unsecured Creditors to
financing the post-payout emergence of Firm from bankruptcy. Put differently: The
two stage financing allows the jump-start financing to take place from the 101st dollar,
rather than the 131st. While this facilitates Bidder's realization of its value from the
use of Firm and improves Bank's probability to collect eventually 130*(1+R), this
bifurcation comes at the expense of Unsecured Creditors, who are squeezed out in the
middle.128 With respect to the ultra-Bank-claim value of 30, Unsecured Creditors are
the true economic sellers. Nonetheless, given the structuring of the financing by the
monopolistic Bank they might be deprived of this value in the classic cash auction
model.129
126
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Oligopolistic Banking
Setting aside the assumption of a single monopolistic bank, a more realistic
analysis must consider the dynamics of the financing of a cash auction in an
oligopolistic banking environment. Is the existence of several banks likely to develop
an effective competition for financing a cash bid for the control of a financially
distressed firm? This paragraph will demonstrate that an affirmative answer to this
question is overly-optimistic.

In concentrated banking economies, the potential

detrimental effect of tacit collusion is substantial particularly in the context of
squeeze-out. In the financing market, the oligopolist banks are repeat players in an
indefinite supergame. This is likely to lead the banks to cooperative behavior rather
than rigorous competition.130 As a result, the banks might limit the competition over
the financing of bids for financially distressed corporations and set the bidding prices
for cash auction at the value of the secured lender's (the bank) prebankruptcy claim.
That is, given a bank's self interest in limiting the amount of finance in Stage I (the
auction) and reserving the remainder for Stage II (post-auction financing), all the
oligopolist banks are liable to limit their financing of the auction bids similarly.
Indeed, in the short-run, financing a higher bid will allow the deviating bank to sway
business from its rivals, but in the long-run this cheating will not pass unpunished.
Based on a classic tit-for-tat strategy, the cheating bank will suffer corrective
retaliation from its rivals who will cheat upon the cheater in future auctions. This
facilitates long term anticompetitive cooperation among the rival banks.131

This

anticompetitive behavior comes at the expense of junior creditors, who are squeezed
out through the cash auction, as explained above.132
It has been shown earlier, that the probability of tacit collusion among
oligopolists is highest when deviation from the collusive behavior is easily and
quickly detected and the number of participant firms is relatively low.133 The early
detection accelerates the infliction of punishing measures against the deviator. The

that risk shifting from senior bank lenders to junior creditors occurs even if both types of creditors are
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low number of participants facilitates the effective coordination of the penalty.
Jacquemin and Slade noted that a readily available detection measure is the
observance of prices offered by rivals in an open bid.134 Where a cash auction is
conducted for a bankrupt firm, which is financed by one of the banks, any bid which
exceeds the value of the secured lender's (i.e. the bank) prebankruptcy claim
immediately reveals for the rival banks a deviation by that bidder's financing bid.135
As for the low number of participants, this is precisely the case in concentrated
banking economies.136
This tacit collusion hazard is Stiglerianly exacerbated when one acknowledges
the limited mobility of bidders from one bank to another in concentrated banking.137
The literature discussing concentrated banking shows that in such economies
customers develop relationship banking activity rather than transaction-based
activity.138 That is, a customer banks primarily with one bank for many years and
seldom shifts to another bank.139 Furthermore, based on data extracted from a survey
of Norwegian firms, Ongena et al. showed that during periods of crisis the
concentration of bank relationship increases, and the use of international banking is
cut by fifty percent (50%).140 This limited mobility fortifies the collusive horizons for
the banks. They need not fear defection of long time customers, as the latter are not
likely to seek financing for a bid on the distressed firm elsewhere.
Oligopolist banks are thus suspect of a cooperative behavior which facilitates
refinancing of their own secured lending through cash auctions while systematically
depriving junior unsecured creditors of surplus value they are entitled to under the
absolute priority rule. This suspicion severely thwarts the efficacy of cash auctions,
as their ultimate goal of value maximization for the creditors is frustrated.

C.

The Homogeneous Options Models
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It has been shown earlier that leading scholars introduced innovative models
which overcome the heterogeneity problem and purport to channel the resolution of
bankruptcy towards a homogeneous decision making regime.141

However, the

common flaw in their models has always been their limited compatibility. To buy out
the senior classes under either the Bebchuk Proposal or the AHM Proposal, the
holders of the options need the coveted cash. That is, the implementation of either
model requires cash, and a significant amount thereof. But, as shown with respect to
the cash auction model of bankruptcy, cash is precisely the resource lacking in
concentrated banking markets. Thus, these models fall short as far as the latter
markets are concerned.142 However, an interesting model which strives to follow the
contours of these Proposals while apparently ameliorating the cash constraint hurdle
was proposed by Hart, La Porta Drago, Lopez-de-Silanes and Moore.143 The HLLM
Proposal, as openly declared by its authors, is an improved AHM Proposal. The
AHM Proposal calls for a vote of the newly converted equityholders on the bids
received for the firm through a market auction. In addition, the HLLM Proposal adds
an earlier auction, in which the firm's (old) claimants would be entitled to exercise
their reorganization-issued options by selling them to outside purchasers. While
HLLM are sensitive to the cash constraint problem and its undermining of the
homogeneity driven models of bankruptcy, their own model is also likely to fail in
concentrated banking markets. The sale of the newly issued options in itself is subject
to a requirement that the outsiders pay cash for the rights purchased. If the outside
acquirer of these options plans to purchase the entire class of options or the majority
thereof, the acquirer will need once again a significant amount of cash. This would
reintroduce the cash-constraint barrier, only from the perspective of the outside
purchaser rather than from the standpoint of the original option holders.
Alternatively, the newly issued options may be acquired on the market by many
141
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purchasers as small fractions of the overall rights in the firm, with each purchaser
investing a minimal amount of cash.144 However, this assumes the existence of a well
developed securities market. It has been shown earlier that in concentrated banking
economies such a market is less developed.145 The trading volume in such markets is
relatively small. In addition, even assuming there exists a well functioning market,
acquisitions of fractions of the newly issued options may be applicable only for
publicly traded firms but not for the closely-held ones.146 The latter type of firm is
found in abundance in concentrated banking markets. In short, these are the flaws
which would prove the inapplicability of the HLLM Proposal in concentrated banking
markets.147

IV.

The Proposed Regime: Non-Cash Auctions

A. The Proposal
The former part established the reason why adopting a cash auction bankruptcy
regime in concentrated banking markets would prove erroneous. Having rejected the
basic model of auctions, the question which now looms is what ought to be the
appropriate bankruptcy regime for such markets in their stead. One possible model is
to readopt the private bargaining regime, under which a reorganization plan is
structured through direct negotiations between the debtor and its prebankruptcy
creditors. However, it has been shown earlier, that while this model has two variants,
either conducting negotiations by the debtor-in-possession (DIP) or by a court
appointed trustee, both suffer from significant shortcomings.148

DIP controlled

negotiations have been widely criticized as a process overly biased in favor of
management and the equityholders.149 On the other side of the bias token, trustee
controlled negotiations are a dubious fit for small economies with concentrated
144
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banking due to the trustee's strong and longtime economic ties with the dominating
creditors.150 Thus, bankruptcy cases of firms in concentrated banking markets merit a
different mechanism for resolving those firms' financial distress and paying off their
creditors.
In my opinion, any resolution must first conform to the legal and cultural tradition
of the country in question.151 It must be a receptive model, easily implemented by the
legal practice.152 As Mark Roe correctly noted, in a free capitalistic society certain
inefficient legal structures may endure more than efficient alternatives to the extent
that they are more feasible politically.153 Attempting to employ a model which is
simplistic and traditionalist enough on one hand, yet responsive to the character of
concentrated banking economies on the other hand, I propose that such markets hold
an open non-cash auction of the debtor firm. Like cash auctions, non-cash auctions
are public and open to any prospective bidder. However, the consideration a bidder
must offer in a non-cash auction differs significantly from that required under a cash
auction procedure. In non-cash auctions, a bidder may offer to pay off the firm's
prebankruptcy claims through an economic package containing any combination of
payment instruments. The payment may include some cash, but also the issuance of
new debt instruments to the old creditors, payable in installments. Alternatively, the
bidder may offer new equity shares in the debtor firm in exchange for the creditors'
prebankruptcy claims.154 Be the consideration paid in a non-cash auction as it may, a
common denominator is shared by all non-cash bidders: to some extent, they all rely
150
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on the future performance of the acquired debtor firm as a means for paying off
prebankruptcy claims. In the case of installment payments, the bidder plans to pay
the claimants out of the firm's future revenues. Equity instruments issued in an
equity-for-debt exchange also derive their value from the firm's future performance.
Effectively, a non-cash auction bankruptcy regime would operate as an improved
and perfected La Salle approach to corporate bankruptcy. Under the U.S. Supreme
Court holding in La Salle,155 whenever a debtor-in-possession proposes a
reorganization plan which distributes value to the equityholders without first fully
paying the creditors and that plan fails to receive the approving vote of all the classes
of creditors, Chapter 11's exclusivity period156 is terminated and the proposed plan is
exposed to the introduction of competing plans.

Essentially, La Salle mandates

choosing among competing plans only if the initial plan proposed allocates value to
the old equityholders. The non-cash auction bankruptcy regime, on the other hand,
would facilitate the introduction of such competing plans ab initio, in every corporate
bankruptcy case. Non-cash auctions reject the initial advantage which management
and equityholders hold under Chapter 11. No party enjoys an exclusivity period
regarding the reorganization plan. The resolution stage is open for all actors in the
market, old claimants and equityholders as well as newcomers, each enjoying an
equal footing in the firm's bankruptcy case.

B. Maximizing Firm's Value
The different consideration used in cash and non-cash auctions is the key to
evaluating the aptness of either to specific economic markets.

In the case of

concentrated banking markets, the major obstacle associated with cash auctions
identified earlier was the powerful position oligopolistic banks hold as the sole
realistic financiers of a bid for the firm. This position adversely affects the auction in
that it frustrates potentially wealth maximizing bids.157 By contrast, non-cash bids
carry the potential of facilitating such bids. The lure of non-cash bids in the context
of concentrated banking markets is that bids can be placed on the debtor firm
independently, without the bidder having to obtain bank financing as a prerequisite.
The disengagement of bidders from the dominating banks would significantly
155
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improve the mechanism of a public auction of the firm. Compared to cash auctions,
in non-cash auctions more bidders can practicably bid on the firm. Thus, a true
competition over the debtor firm, the core of auction theory, would be perfected.158
With more bids being placed on the firm, a reliable market-based valuation may be
extracted from the auction procedure.

Indeed, each bid would likely reflect the

bidder's valuation of the debtor firm, not the bank's.159 In short, to the extent it is a
market based valuation of the firm one seeks in bankruptcy, in concentrated banking
markets that valuation is more likely to be generated through a non-cash auction
procedure rather than through a cash auction.
Correlatively, releasing bidders from the financing cords of the dominating banks
allows new entities to place bids which maximize value to the debtor firm's creditors.
Compared to the private bargaining model of bankruptcy, non-cash auctions promote
exogenous resolutions of a firm's financial distress rather than limiting the solutions to
the firm's prebankruptcy actors.160 Consistent with auction theory, widening the circle
of potential participants facilitates reaching the goal of maximizing the firm's value.161

C. Modifying Creditors' Legal Rights
Holding a non-cash auction allows the parties to enjoy a market valuation of the
corporation. However, unlike cash auctions, in non-cash auctions the determination
of that market valuation is itself subject to further analysis. Indeed, one of the more
appealing features of a cash auction regime is the certainty and finality of the
distribution to the creditors. In a cash auction, the firm's assets are realized and the
actual cash proceeds are distributed to the creditors based on their respective priority.
No speculations and estimations need to be made concerning the firm's value and no
underlying assumptions remain relevant any longer. A cash auction renders any
negotiations between the auctioneer and the firm's creditors obsolete. The distribution
158
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to the creditors shall be determined exclusively by the amount of the highest cash bid.
In essence, a cash auction regime shares proximate attributes with a straight-forward
liquidation procedure.162
Conversely, in a non-cash auction no specified cash is placed on the table for
distribution to the firm's prebankruptcy creditors upon the announcement of the
winning bid. Rather, the payment is based on the firm's future performance. This
entails that differentiating one bid from another cannot be based simply on a bidder's
self assigned dollar value of its bid. Several parameters affect the true economic
value of a bid. The total period of time during which the installment payments are
due as well as the interest rate they bear, the nature of the future business of the firm
once a bid is accepted, and the security and guarantees the bidder is proposing to back
the deferred payments may all vary from one bidder to another. These variables need
to be considered in connection with valuing a non-cash bid.

In addition, the

managerial skills of each bidder play a major role in weighing their respective bids.163
In other words, from the creditors' perspective the actual satisfaction of their legal
claims is postponed further into the future. In a manner which in this respect (and this
respect only) is somewhat reminiscent of privately-bargained reorganizations, the
creditors remain as claimants or equityholders of the corporation beyond the
immediate horizon of the reorganization case. The creditors' claims are yet to be
satisfied. Unlike a cash auction, which involves the actual realization of the firm's
assets, the ensuing distribution of the proceeds to the creditors and the termination of
all debtor-creditors legal relationships, a non-cash auction requires the creditors to
exchange one set of legal rights relating to the firm (the prebankruptcy claims) with
another. In the legal sense, non-cash bids potentially modify the creditors' claims in
several ways. First, one must ascertain whether the present value of a bid is equal to
the creditors' prebankruptcy total amount of claims or smaller. Secondly, even if the
present value of a bid is equal to the value of the prebankruptcy claims, modifying the
payment period in itself, although compensated through the interest promised to be
paid thereupon, alters the original legal rights of those creditors. Finally, issuing
equity interests in lieu of the creditors' claims alters completely the nature of the
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creditors' rights in that it turns them from creditors to shareholders.164 From the legal
perspective, the modification of creditors' rights in non-cash auctions requires holding
a vote on the bids. It follows then, that non-cash auctions should be completed
through a vote taking place once all the bids have been placed. Indeed, the economic
preference of the relevant stakeholders must be voiced through their voting for the
superior bid as they deem it. Thus, a non-cash auction bankruptcy regime should
follow the procedural steps of existing private-negotiations bankruptcy regimes.
Although they differ in economic substance, that is non-cash auctions facilitate
market based bids for the firm while privately negotiated reorganization plans
facilitate solely the concrete proponent's bid, both regimes ought to share the same
legal procedure for officially approving the chosen reorganization plan.
In a non-cash auction, voting by creditors on the various bids entails a collective
decision-making which involves divergent creditors with heterogeneous interests. It
has been noted earlier that the heterogeneity problem casts a shadow over the integrity
and efficacy of the private-bargaining bankruptcy prototype.165

Unlike private-

bargaining, non-cash auctions enjoy a competitive atmosphere and an openness of the
procedure to any interested participant.

Thus, gaining bargaining leverage and

distorting the terms of the reorganization plan, the cons of private-bargaining, would
not impede the integrity of non-cash auctions. Nonetheless, collective voting on the
competing bids by classes of creditors cannot avoid the heterogeneity phenomenon.
Indeed, the involvement of divergent interests of creditors and equityholders in the
bankruptcy proceeding is an inherent derivative of the law which confers priority on
some creditors while denies such benefits to the others.166 As long as the priority
system is justified and rests on sound legal policy, the heterogeneity phenomenon
should be accepted as part of the rules of the game. In Part III it has been shown that
the drive towards a homogeneous-interests bankruptcy regime appears to be utopian.
Reality proves that concentrated banking markets necessitate a heterogeneous-
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interests bankruptcy regime. Among such potential regimes, the non-cash auction
regime proves superior.167

D. Enhancing Collective Decision Making
Voting on the competing bids in a non-cash auction allows all old creditors of the
debtor firm to opine on each bid and to declare the one mostly favored by them. In
concentrated banking economies, a creditors' voting necessarily means (re)turning to
the voice of the dominating bank. As explained, that bank is invariably the senior
secured prebankruptcy creditor of the debtor firm.168 Thus, an encounter between a
bidder and the dominating bank is unavoidable. This eventual encounter begs the
question: what then has been gained by utilizing non-cash auctions? The underlying
rationale of preferring non-cash auctions is to facilitate bids that are independent of
bank financing and the banks' ultimate control.169 But this rationale seems to be
completely eroded by the banks' effective influence over the outcome of the auction in
their capacity as senior creditors. In other words, what non-cash auctions seem to
successfully avoid apparently backfires as the banks, in their capacity as
prebankruptcy creditors of the debtor firm, vote on the actual non-cash bids. And yet,
this is not the case. Non-cash auctions can make a difference and enhance an auction
resolution of financial distress. A vote on non-cash auction bids is more complex
than straight forward cash bids financed by a bank. Financing a cash bid effectively
makes the bank the sole decider of the actual winning bid and the value available for
distribution to the creditors as a result thereof.170 By contrast, in non-cash auctions,
the bank is one of a whole group of creditors voting on the bids made. Obviously, as
a creditor of the firm the bank is entitled to voice its opinion on a modification of its
rights. But so do the other creditors. Realistically, considering the bank's position as
the major supplier of credit and the collateral securing its claim, the bank has a
significant and influential position within the framework of the voting process.
However, other creditors, whose claims are also at stake in the bankruptcy of the
167
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common debtor firm, voice their opinions on the various bids as well. In a non-cash
auction, the winning bid is determined by a democratic process, which gives
appropriate weight to all relevant claims, not just the bank's senior claim. The voting
process counterbalances the bank's market advantage by imposing a legal proceeding
which induces a collective decision rather than a dictation of a result which is most
convenient for the bank's own interests.171
Voting on non-cash auctions enjoys the virtue of a collective decision-making. To
implement this ideal practically, though, the voting procedure taking place in a noncash auction regime must be one which negates a de facto absolute control of the
voting outcome by any single creditor in general and the dominating bank in
particular. Because their interests are in conflict with one another, as a result of their
divergent distributive priorities, different creditors are classified separately and vote
within classes.172 Secured creditors are classified separately.173 Analytically, each
secured creditor constitutes a class of its own, based on its unique and specific interest
in the firm's assets. By contrast, unsecured creditors are usually classified together in
a single class.174 It follows, then, that to achieve the collective decision-making goal,
any law implementing a non-cash auction bankruptcy regime must overcome the
potential veto power the banks may possess through their separate classification.
Overcoming a veto vote may be accomplished through a prototypical cram-down
provision.175 To be sure, cram-down is no absolute priority rule negating measure.176
The non-cash auction regime would follow the conventional APR distribution order.
171
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The cram-down provision would simply serve as a supplementary judicially directed
mechanism, aimed at ameliorating the absolute control over the determination of the
winning bid that the concentrated banks would otherwise obtain. Cram-down would
allow the other creditors to bring to the fore, through a judicial proceeding, a
competing bid, which the banks have ruled out (through their class vote) as "too
risky". The cram-down provision is a countervailing measure to the banks' ultimate
control over the auction's outcome. It is not meant to bypass the banks' vote, only to
subject that vote to a judicial check.177 Given the perils that concentrated banking
causes in corporate bankruptcy, this check is a necessary measure to complement the
non-cash auction solution.

E. Subtle Antitrust Measures
Despite working within the context of bankruptcy and thus affecting directly
creditors' rights, non-cash auctions may also serve a broader cause. Such auctions
also may be considered a fine measure for combating the perils of tacit collusion in
concentrated banking. It has been noted earlier that a major limitation for enforcing
antitrust law is the costs of detection of anticompetitive practices. This is the reason
that explicit cartels are invariably regulated while tacit collusions are somewhat
beyond the scope of antitrust law.178 In addition, even where the anticompetitive
practice is detected the enforcement of antitrust law measures entails costly actions,
such as lawsuits and continuous monitoring of the colluding parties.179 Employing
subtle competition enhancing measures through other fields of law may prove a
positive complement to antitrust law in its attempt to combat anticompetitive
measures such as tacit collusions.

Thus, when the law can overcome an

anticompetitive measure by adopting alternative mechanisms which obviate the
dependency on the oligopolists' services, antitrust policy is served. Such alternative
measures operate at a low cost. They encourage economic competition rather than
177
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walk the legal path of detecting anticompetitive practice and enforcing penalizing
measures thereagainst. Non-cash auctions exemplify such subtle antitrust measures.
They are a classic illustration of implementing antitrust policy through bankruptcy
law measures.180 Obviously, achieving the antitrust goals is secondary to meeting the
primary concerns of bankruptcy law itself. However, once it has been demonstrated
that non-cash auctions facilitate the maximization of value to the firm's creditors,
serving antitrust policy blends integrally with meeting bankruptcy law's own goals.

CONCLUSION
This article addressed the normative approach to bankruptcy law. The question
which bankruptcy law model is optimal has occupied the academic literature for many
years now. Yet, the various models suggested by leading authorities in this field were
mostly planted in U.S. grounds. The literature has largely disregarded the various
factors which separate different economic regimes. Countries around the world differ
in their economic structure. The financial conditions of a country like the U.S. may
facilitate effective competition over the financing of market activities, but in other
countries such competition barely exists. The article tackled the issue of countries
where effective competition over financing is hardly existent and the ramifications of
such financial constraints on the resolution of corporate bankruptcy. The article
approached the phenomenon of concentrated banking economies as a given structure
of many economies around the world.

It showed, however, that even one who

considers concentrated banking as overall efficient cannot ignore the concrete
hazardous ramifications which concentrated banking holds for financing cash bids for
distressed firms.

This article established the anticompetitive measures which

oligopolistic banks are likely to use to frustrate value-maximizing cash bids. The
banks are suspects of unilaterally imposing caps on their financing of any potential
cash bid for the firm, caps which inter alia are a function of those banks'
prebankruptcy senior secured claims.

The cash constraint problem from which

players in concentrated banking economies suffer is exacerbated by the corresponding
180
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underdevelopment of local stock markets in such economies. Thus, when Douglas
Baird has called for implementing a cash auction bankruptcy regime he clearly did
not have concentrated banking economies in mind. When bidders lack the requisite
cash, and their only source for obtaining it is an oligopoly group of banks, the cash
auction will fail to promote the goal of efficiency.

Baird's proposal is simply

inadequate for such economies. Likewise, the innovative bankruptcy proposals of
Bebchuk, AHM and HLLM, all of which call for converting the prebankruptcy rights
of creditors and shareholders to newly issued options to buy out the firm's equity
rights, also fall short due to the lack of available cash for exercising the buy-out
options or for acquiring those rights through the market.
In view of the incompatibility of these cash consuming, market oriented, models
of corporate bankruptcy this article proposed to adopt an alternative market oriented
bankruptcy model. It proposed employing a non-cash auction regime, under which
bidders would be encouraged to bid for the control of the firm while reducing the
bidders' dependency on bank financing. Cutting the Gordian knot between all bidders
and bank financing is essential for facilitating efficient market-based bankruptcies in
concentrated banking economies. The outcome of a non-cash auction would be
determined by a vote of the various classes of claimants, in a manner similar to the
current procedure of U.S. Chapter 11. Effectively, this model would prove to be a
perfected La Salle bankruptcy scheme. In all bankruptcy cases, internal and external
bidding would be invited, thus ensuring a healthy competition which would maximize
the ex post value of the firm, to the benefit of all claimants.
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